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capture enzyme-linked immunosor-
bent assay) and reverse transcriptase-
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)
tests for flaviviruses, alphaviruses,
and Bunyamwera serogroup bunyavi-
ruses were also negative. RT-PCR for
Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever
virus (C-CHFV) was positive. Tests
for anti-C-CHFV–specific IgM anti-
body by indirect immunofluorescence
were negative. Virus isolation
attempts were then terminated because
the cultivation of C-CHFV (the pre-
sumptive cause) requires biosafety
level 4 facilities. The specimen was
submitted to the Special Pathogens
Unit in Johannesburg for confirmation
of the result. The sample was positive
by RT-PCR for C-CHFV and was IgM
and IgG antibody negative. No isola-
tion of the virus could be made from
the serum sample, possibly because it
was received by the Johannesburg lab-
oratory 8 days after initial collection
and following freeze-thaw conditions.
The specimen was insufficient to
attempt C-CHVF antigen detection
assays. Sequencing of the RT-PCR
amplicon confirmed C-CHFV.
C-CHFV is a tick-borne virus of
the genus Nairovirus, family Bun-
yaviridae, and is widely distributed
throughout eastern Europe and the
Crimea, to the Middle East and west-
ern China, Pakistan, and Africa. Natu-
ral hosts for this virus are varied
(including wild and domestic animals
and birds) and may reflect the feeding
preferences of the host tick (1). While
C-CHFV infections are rare in
humans, the virus is notorious for
nosocomial outbreaks of VHF, typi-
cally following admission of an index
case to a health-care facility where
VHF was not suspected, with mortal-
ity rates up to 40%. 
Previous evidence for C-CHFV in
Kenya is limited and based on serol-
ogy (human and bovine) and two iso-
lations of C-CHFV from non-human
sources (1,2). This report represents
the first documented case of acute
human C-CHFV infection in Kenya.
The hospital concerned belongs to a
VHF surveillance network serving to
increase awareness and preparedness
within Kenyan health-care facilities.
In this case suspicion of VHF was
raised, and the patient was immedi-
ately isolated, noninvasive procedures
were instigated, and barrier nursing
was implemented to prevent nosoco-
mial transmission. No family or hospi-
tal staff member who had close
contact with the patient became ill.
Although VHFs are rare, this report
stresses the need for health facilities in
Kenya and East/Central Africa to
include VHFs in their differential
diagnosis of unexplained fever with
hemorrhagic tendencies, as well as the
utility of the surveillance network.
The causative agents of Ebola hemor-
rhagic fever, Marburg hemorrhagic
fever, C-CHFV, Rift Valley fever, and
yellow fever are all endemic in East
and Central Africa, and sporadic
cases, as well as outbreaks, are likely
to continue to occur in this region
(3–5).
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Preparing at the 
Local Level for 
Events Involving 
Weapons of Mass 
Destruction
To the Editor: The use of hi-
jacked airplanes in the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon
on September 11, 2001, clearly illus-
trated the immediate and massive
destruction that can result from a well-
orchestrated, long-planned, and pur-
poseful terrorist act. Weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) events (i.e., bio-
logical, nuclear, or chemical attacks)
present different challenges than other
incidents involving mass casualties
(e.g., chemical spills, transportation
mishaps, or natural disasters). Persons
involved in a biological weapons
attack, for example, may take days to
develop symptoms and seek medical
care (1); a large geographic area may
be affected, or persons may travel long
distances and unwittingly infect oth-
ers, including hospital personnel (2).
Furthermore, traditional hazardous
materials and emergency medical pro-
cedures may be inadequate to respond
to a WMD event (3–5). As events of
September 11 and its aftermath make
clear, medical public health systems
were not optimally prepared. An
effective response to a WMD event
focuses on two key areas: joint efforts
between the medical community and
public health agencies and better
trained and coordinated first respond-
ers (i.e., law enforcement, public
safety, hospital personnel, and public
health officials) (1–3).  
In early 2001, telephone inter-
views with West Virginia county
health directors (CHDs) or their
equivalent were conducted to ascer-
1Dr. Kazooba-Voskamp, the attending phy-
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tain the level of collaboration between
their departments and local hospitals
in regard to WMD preparedness and a
coordinated medical and public health
response.  Forty-four (90%) of 49
CHDs completed the interview. One
of the 49 responding CHDs is respon-
sible for a six-county area, thus
accounting for the state’s 55 counties.
Fewer than half (20 of 44) of the
respondents have provided contact
information to local hospitals, and
barely 20% have reciprocal informa-
tion. Twenty-one percent were either
unaware of a policy for WMD pre-
paredness or reported that it was being
handled by another agency. Although
72% of CHDs had attended WMD
training, only 14% of the training was
in conjunction with hospitals. While
nearly two thirds rated their communi-
cation with hospitals as moderate to
strong, a similar proportion stated they
had no protocol for communicating
with hospitals about a WMD event.
Eighty-six percent of CHDs reported
that no new collaborative efforts were
directed towards the early identifica-
tion of new or emerging infectious
diseases possibly related to bioterror-
ism. However, approximately one
third of the CHDs thought they should
take initiative in this matter. Over 60%
indicated that primary responsibility
for identifying biological agents rested
in another agency or was not the sole
responsibility of the CHD. Further,
20% indicated they were weak or
untrained in this area and thought that
development and implementation of
policies, procedures, and training were
needed. While 93% of CHDs felt joint
training with hospitals would be bene-
ficial, particularly in defining their
respective roles in a WMD scenario,
many cited manpower and scheduling
constraints for such joint training ses-
sions. Overall, CHDs reported weak
relationships with area hospitals, but
thought that development or improve-
ment of policies and procedures
through regular meetings and training
would help prepare and plan for a
WMD event. 
The results of this survey suggest
that before September 11, West Vir-
ginia CHDs and local hospitals had lit-
tle collaboration in preparing to
respond to a WMD event. Despite the
recent terrorist activities, local health
departments and hospitals may still be
reluctant to spend resources in prepa-
ration for events with a low probabil-
ity of occurring, such as WMD
incidents. The local health depart-
ments and hospitals think that other
pressing programs will be jeopardized
(6–8). Many federal and state initia-
tives are under way to enhance the
public health infrastructure and its
preparation and response to bioterror-
ism. Improving on programs to meet
daily operational challenges, as well
as those presented by a WMD event,
must include the expertise of local
health departments and hospitals and
encourage the creation of innovative,
cost-effective preparedness programs
at the local level (9,10).  Future
research should be conducted in areas
of resource education and training,
allocation and sharing, personnel, and
policy. This research will indicate if
existing programs should be improved
and if new programs should be insti-
tuted.  
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Correction, Vol. 8, No. 5
In “Phylogenetic Analysis of a Human Isolate from the 2000
Israel West Nile virus Epidemic” by Thomas Briese et al., errors
occurred in the text and figure legend. On page 529, right column,
line 25, and in the figure legend on page 530, the host species for
ISR-00PigC is pigeon. Additionally, in the figure legend, the
GenBank accession no. for ISR-00PigC is AF380671, and the
GenBank accession no. for WNV-ROM96(0334)-1996 is
AF205879.
The online article at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/
vol8no5/01-0324.htm has been corrected.
We regret any confusion these errors may have caused.
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